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The Forgotten Founding Document:  
Considering the Ends of the Law 
A. Scott Loveless* 
Abstract 
In the jurisprudence of the last several decades, many issues have been 
addressed that have moral overtones. Abortion, the display of religious tenets 
on public property, expressions of faith in the pledge of allegiance or coinage, 
same-sex marriage, the ability of a state legislature to forbid homosexual con-
duct, whether and to what degree pornography is protected as free speech, and 
the ability of the people of a state to prevent same-sex attraction to be raised to 
the status of a protected class under their law, all raise moral questions, not 
merely legal ones. These are not only questions of constitutionality, but also of 
what we might call conflicts over the background morality and the moral ob-
jectives that guide American law, and what might be termed the “ends of the 
law.”1 
In all such cases, the advocates on each side typically claim the moral high 
ground for their respective positions, asserting the moral superiority of their 
own position over the benighted, insensitive, discriminatory, outmoded, liberal 
(or radical), conservative (or reactionary), hateful (or motivated by animus), 
outlandish, irrational or (fill in the pejorative blank) position of the other side. 
But how are courts, much less private citizens, to be guided in matters where 
opposing groups each claim not only the better solution to a political problem, 
but a moral justification for its position? How should legislators and courts (or 
even the people) handle moral dilemmas on this scale? Is there any legal au-
thority applicable to such questions? This paper proposes that we seek answers 
 
 *  A. Scott Loveless, JD, PhD, is a retired faculty member and former Executive Director 
of the World Family Policy Center at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young Univer-
sity, Provo, Utah. He has served as a consulting attorney in natural resources law and works at 
present in the Office of the Solicitor of the U.S. Department of the Interior. This paper was 
presented at the Symposium on Whether the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage Is Constitutionally 
Required at the J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, Novem-
ber 2, 2012. The views expressed here are those of the author and are not attributable to anyone 
else. He wishes to acknowledge and thank Megumi Yamada Kenworthy for her invaluable re-
search assistance and his wife, Cheri Loveless, for her unfailing support and editorial assistance.  
 1. In this regard, I recommend Stephen Smith, Law’s Quandary (2004). 
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to these questions in a long-neglected document: The Declaration of Independ-
ence. First, it argues that the Declaration is a useful legal document precisely 
in such difficult moral cases; next it discusses the moral basis for the Declara-
tion’s assertions about government and freedom; and finally, it points out and 
discusses the consequent unconstitutional nature of the judicial activism that 
has given rise to, or at least abetted, the larger modern culture wars, and one 
of their many modern battlegrounds, the important “marriage question.”2 
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 2. This paper will not be a historical treatise on the ebbs and flows of various modern 
schools of legal thought about the philosophical foundations of law (legal conceptualism, logical 
positivism, legal realism, intentionalism, originalism, feminism, etc.). In this regard I recommend 
Smith, supra note 1. 
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I. Background 
“The Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”  
—Declaration of Independence, Preamble3 
The contemporary legal community in the United States generally 
assumes that the Declaration of Independence has no serious role to 
play in our modern legal system.4 It is counted a figurehead, but ulti-
mately only a symbolic one, and certainly not a document with legal 
force, relevant, for example, in interpreting the Constitution.5 As prec-
edential authority, it is ignored in most constitutional law courses6 and 
is not generally accepted as authority in practice or policy.7 This was 
not always so. Aside from the founding itself, the principles of the Dec-
laration played a formative role in President Lincoln’s justification for 
not allowing states to secede and for pursuing the Civil War;8 its 1776 
date provided his reference to “fourscore and seven years ago” in his 
Gettysburg Address,9 and its ideals provided the referent background 
for his second inaugural address and the extinction of slavery in this 
country.10 For an extended period in the nineteenth century the Dec-
laration was actively looked to for guidance in interpreting the Con-
stitution.11 Justice Brewer, for example, wrote in 1897: 
The first official action of this nation declared the foundation of gov-
ernment in these words “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness.” While such declaration of principles may 
 
 3. The Declaration of Independence pmbl. (U.S. 1776). 
 4. E.g., Bowler v. Welsh, 719 F. Supp. 25, 26 (D. Me. 1989) (noting that federal courts 
have “no jurisdiction over claims allegedly arising under the Declaration of Independence.”). 
 5. See id. 
 6. This assertion comes largely from the author’s own experience, but it is also notewor-
thy that the Index of Erwin Chemerinky’s text book on Constitutional Law, for example, contains 
no reference of the Declaration of Independence. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law 
(3d ed. 2009). 
 7. See Bowler, 719 F. Supp at 26. 
 8. Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham 
Lincoln (2006). 
 9. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 10. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/11DQTom. 
 11. Other authors have dealt with the history of this process and many of its ramifications 
in trends in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration of In-
dependence: A 225th Anniversary Re-interpretation, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 701, 703–05 (2001). 
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not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis of judicial 
decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases ref-
erence must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, 
yet the latter is but the body and the letter of which the former is the 
thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the 
Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.12 
As Justice Brewer indicates, the Declaration was seen as having le-
gal effect because it established the legal philosophy on which the Con-
stitution was based, the “foundation of government,” the philosophy 
that permeates every word and provides its guiding spirit. The Decla-
ration declared the foundation of government in general, and the 
United States’ government in specific, to be what some call “natural 
law,” or “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.”13 The Declaration 
and its reference to natural law thus comprise a chapeau by which to 
read the Constitution.14 In this light, perhaps the single most uncon-
stitutional act a government entity, including a court, could commit 
would be to disregard and act inconsistent with that philosophy. Such 
actions would go against not simply a clause or phrase of the Consti-
tution; they would go against the core and foundation of the Consti-
tution itself. 
All law rests on some fundamental deontology or moral philoso-
phy, some idea of right and wrong, what we might term the objectives 
or “ends” of the law. Law’s most basic purpose is to provide order in a 
society that is otherwise potentially chaotic, but even that statement is 
premised on a moral concept—that order is better than chaos. Where 
people disagree, law provides a way to decide between competing views 
without resorting to fisticuffs or mob rule. If “unjust discrimination” is 
found and condemned, for example, it may be because the law requires 
that this result ensue, but the “law” only does so because of an under-
lying moral sense in society that some forms of discrimination are 
wrong—that it is simply not right to discriminate against people due to 
some factor over which they have no control, such as skin color or na-
tional origin, or that some freedoms should be protected over which we 
do have control, such as freedom of religious choice or political affili-
ation. 
 
 12. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159–60 (1897) (quoting The 
Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776)). 
 13. The Declaration of Independence, supra note 3, at pmbl. 
 14. By “chapeau,” I reference the French usage, roughly equivalent to ejustem generis only 
in reverse; it supplies the context within which to read what follows. 
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As in the modern era, in 1776 the Founders of the United States 
of America were dealing with philosophical legal questions that had 
plagued humankind for millennia, questions they hoped to put to rest, 
but which continue to arise: Which is the higher authority, the State 
or the People? Can a state properly create a moral system through law 
and then use the authority of law to enforce it? The Declaration of 
Independence, the “first official action” of the new government, to 
quote Justice Brewer,15 represents their collective answer to these fun-
damental questions. 
After two and a quarter centuries, it can be easy to overlook or take 
for granted the novel place it played in world history, but the Declara-
tion of Independence represented a monumental break with the theory 
of government of its European antecedents. Until 1776, governments 
traditionally held that the State, usually in the form of a royal line, held 
supreme authority, dispensing rights to the people as an act of magna-
nimity. All such rights were held privately only at the discretion and 
pleasure of the monarch. Even the English Magna Carta, often de-
scribed as the first relatively modern recognition of the limited power 
of the sovereign, only recognized superior rights in the nobility, not in 
the common man, and it did so only by virtue of a grant of these rights 
from King John (later contested and eventually confirmed, under pres-
sure, by Henry III and later kings).16 
The Founders emphatically broke with this tradition. The Decla-
ration of Independence asserted that as a direct function of the “Laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God” and as a self-evident truth, “all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights.”17 As Thomas Jefferson put it, “[a] free people 
[claim] their rights as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the 
 
 15. Gulf, 165 U.S. at 159. 
 16. “We have also granted to all free men [i.e. nobility, not the majority peasants and serfs] 
of our kingdom, for ourselves and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written below, to be had and 
held by them and their heirs of us and our heirs.” Magna Carta, cl. 1 (1215). Only after hun-
dreds of years in England did the Magna Carta come to be regarded (largely through re-inter-
pretation in the writings of Edward Coke, 1552–1634) as an entrenched set of liberties guaran-
teed to the people against the monarch and government generally, and this after intervening 
periods of neglect, disregard, and outright opposition by various monarchs, particularly over the 
issue whether it was binding upon the King. Magna Carta, Encyclopædia Britannica, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/356831/Magna-Carta (last visited Mar. 29, 2013); 
see also Godfrey Rupert Carless Davis, Magna Carta (1977); J.C. Holt, Magna Carta 
(2d ed. 1992); S.I. Jennings, Magna Carta and its Influence in the  
World Today (1965). 
 17. The Declaration of Independence, supra note 3, at para. 2. 
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gift of their chief magistrate.”18 Proper government, the Declaration 
clarified, is instituted by the people, who in essence delegate limited 
powers to their chosen governing bodies in order to help secure these 
rights, not to create them, and certainly not to interfere with them. 
This was no mere passing intellectual fad or convenient argument for 
their position, but a recognition of what they surmised to be a deep 
truth about the nature of mankind and of the place and foundation of 
government. The Founders risked their lives for this belief, wresting 
their freedoms from King George, claiming those freedoms as derived 
from a higher law than the King’s. 
This claim was virgin ground as an implemented basis for govern-
ment, asserting compliance with this “higher law” as the only morally 
legitimate foundation for government. It permitted the further bold 
proclamation that government could be held accountable for its com-
pliance with the moral standard established by “the Laws of Nature 
and of Nature’s God.” The Declaration thus proceeded to evaluate 
King George’s performance against that standard, effectually declaring 
his actions morally wrong, and consequently withdrawing his authority 
to govern the former colonies. The American colonists, in effect, held 
King George accountable for his failure to respect the rights granted 
them by “Nature’s God,” a higher law than his own. Noting the King’s 
many failings in this obligation, the colonists withdrew his right to gov-
ern them at all, and proceeded to set up a government that would re-
spect the rights King George had so denigrated. 
The Declaration of Independence was not mere rhetoric. It was a 
document drafted with specific legal intent and effect: to “declare the 
causes”19 for and to proceed with the termination of suzerain relations 
with Great Britain and the establishment of a better government. The 
legal justification for taking this extreme action was grounded in the 
existence and reality of natural law, which stands apart from and inde-
pendent of any governing entity. It is a non sequitur to read the Consti-
tution apart from this philosophical grounding. The Constitution was 
drafted to comply with the natural law standard King George had 
failed to meet. 
Yet, legal treatment of the Declaration and natural law has fluctu-
ated wildly since 1776. Today’s affirmative neglect can be attributed to 
 
 18. Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America 120–21 
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984) (1774). 
 19. The Declaration of Independence, supra note 3, at pmbl. 
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many causes, not the least of which is Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
disdainful but influential dismissal of the entire concept of natural 
law.20 John Locke, whom Thomas Jefferson placed alongside Isaac 
Newton and Francis Bacon as “the three greatest men the world had 
ever produced,”21 once noted that natural law provides the standard by 
which one may know of the justice of any government.22 The Ameri-
can Founders took Locke seriously, seeing a fundamental truth in his 
observations, but Justice Holmes dismissed all of them as “naïve,” 
mocked natural law as “that brooding omnipresence in the sky,”23 and 
initiated a trend in American law toward faith in rational secularism 
and science that has in recent years seemingly relegated the Declara-
tion to the curio pile and natural law to the dustbin.24 
The virtual omission of the Declaration’s philosophical guidance 
in our current legal system and the subsequent rise of legal realism and 
other modern strains of jurisprudence have opened the way for many 
jurists to adopt alternative ideas to guide their interpretations of law, 
 
 20. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918). 
 21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Rush, in 11 The Works of Thomas Jef-
ferson 168 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1905). 
 22. Locke points out that the bounds of government are natural law: 
A Man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the Arbitrary Power of another; 
and having in the State of Nature no Arbitrary Power over the Life, Liberty, or Pos-
session of another, but only so much as the Law of Nature gave him for the preserva-
tion of himself, and the rest of Mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the 
Common-wealth, and by it to the Legislative Power, so that the Legislative can have 
no more than this. Their Power in the utmost Bounds of it, is limited to the publick 
good of the Society. . . . Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, 
Legislators as well as other. The Rules that they make for other Mens [sic] Actions, 
must, as well as their own and other Mens [sic] Actions, be conformable to the Law of 
Nature, i.e. to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental 
Law of Nature being the preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, 
or valid against it. 
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 402–03 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1965) (1689) (emphasis omitted). 
 23. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoted lan-
guage refers to “common law,” but used in the sense referred to here as “natural law.”) Elsewhere, 
after dismissing natural law, Justice Holmes stated that jurists who believe in it are doubtless in a 
“naïve state of mind.” Holmes, supra note 20, at 41. This evinces how professional myopia can 
contribute to the erosion of the basic principles the Declaration and Constitution once relied 
upon. 
 24. Justice Holmes perhaps had not read Thomas Jefferson’s observation: “I fear, from the 
experience of the last twenty-five years, that morals do not of necessity advance hand in hand 
with the sciences.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to M. Correa de Serra (June 28, 1815), available 
at http://bit.ly/Xj9uYO. 
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to engage in sometimes dubious “appellate fact-finding” about societal 
trends and values,25 and to impose personal views on decisions without 
waiting for “the people” to speak for themselves, either directly or 
through legislation. In recent decades, such “judicial activism” has pro-
duced several controversial decisions that have provoked increasing 
concern about whether the courts have remained evenhanded in their 
distribution of justice or whether “individual preference” has been 
deemed acceptable as a new guiding norm. Justice Scalia addressed this 
kind of judicial activism with his insight in his dissent in Lawrence v. 
Texas that “the Court has taken sides in the culture war.”26 
Justice Scalia’s is only a late observation of a process that began 
much earlier. The judicial activism represented by Griswold v. Connect-
icut27 and its invention of a Constitutional “penumbra” and a “right of 
privacy” (in the laudatory object of preserving the sanctity of marriage, 
but which might have been accomplished with a simple reference to 
natural law) has since proceeded to expand, alter, and inflate this new 
“right” into the preferred weapon in the battle to redefine and vitiate 
the very concept of marriage and marital commitment that the Court 
had used to justify it. Proceeding through Roe v. Wade28 and its succes-
sors in the abortion struggle, as well as in the more recent decisions in 
Romer v. Evans,29 Lawrence v. Texas,30  Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health,31 and now most recently in the California Supreme Court’s 
decision, In re Marriage Cases32 and the subsequent struggles in that 
state, the Court’s version of this invented and subsequently distorted 
right of privacy and the judicial activism that engendered it continue 
to polarize the American people. On two occasions—Romer v. Evans 
and California’s In re Marriage Cases—courts have actually overruled 
decisions of the people.33 Marriage, a product itself of “natural law,” 
 
 25. For example, the majority expressed in Lawrence v. Texas “that our laws and traditions 
. . . show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in de-
ciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 571–72 (2003). 
 26. Id. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965). 
 28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 29. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 31. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 748 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 32. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 33. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623, 635 (overruling an amendment to the Colorado Constitution 
prohibiting same-sex marriage which had been adopted by way of a statewide referendum); In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 399 (overruling legislative and ballot-initiative measures prohibiting 
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was the sacred justification for overturning Connecticut’s ban on con-
dom sales in Griswold,34 but is now in danger of falling victim to the 
very “right of privacy” which derived from it—the “penumbral” right 
now threatens the structure, marriage, that gave it rise. 
To date, in attempts to inoculate themselves from the potential ef-
fects of the Goodridge case in Massachusetts, thirty-eight states have 
either amended their constitutions or enacted laws that protect man-
woman marriage.35 Meanwhile, several others (and some of the same 
states) have enacted legislation allowing either same-sex civil unions or 
marriage.36 Marriage, once sacrosanct enough to overturn a state law, 
has become a political football. Meanwhile, social activists continue 
their efforts to reform society in their preferred philosophical image,37 
using sympathetic, activist jurists to advance their cause. Just as “toler-
ance” has changed for some from “agreeing to disagree and still get 
along” to “you’re intolerant if you don’t accept me and my lifestyle,” 
“constitutional” seems in many cases to have changed from “consistent 
with the Founders’ intent” to “consistent with our recent interpreta-
tions and pronouncements of what the Constitution means.” “Follow 
us,” the judicial activists say, “not the Founders.” 
Given the high and rising levels of social problems experienced 
under the guardianship of “legal realism” and its variations, perhaps it 
is time to again consider the wisdom of the Founders. It is clear that 
they saw natural law as the source of all rights in the people, including 
the inalienable right to form a government that protected those 
rights—and to abolish or disengage from one that did not. However, 
what exactly did they mean by “natural law?” 
 
same-sex marriage in California). 
 34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
 35. Following are the states that have protected man-woman marriage: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, In-
diana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wy-
oming. See Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, http://ncsl.org/issues-research/human-ser-
vices/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). 
 36. Following are the states that allow same-sex civil unions or marriages: Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. See id. 
 37. The activists similarly use the media, active legislative and even judicial lobbying, and 
strategic political contributions as well as boycotting and harassing those who oppose their posi-
tions. See, e.g., Joshua Green, They Won’t Know What Hit Them, Atlantic (Mar. 1, 2007, 12:00 
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200703/tim-gill. 
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Without becoming embroiled in the centuries-old debate about 
the definition, precise scope, and content of natural law, two principles 
seem clearly within the founders’ contemplation and intent.38 First, 
natural law exists independently of government as a basic truth of hu-
man nature, with the object of the preservation of humankind. Sec-
ondly, natural law fundamentally has to do with a universal moral sense 
of how we deal with and treat other people. Natural law incorporates 
a morality that places limits on personal (as well as governmental) be-
havior, claiming at least that freedom does not extend to allowing peo-
ple to harm one another, as individuals or as a society.39 In other words, 
natural law insists that our rights are inseparably connected with, and 
related to, our duties and obligations to others, and that freedom is 
ultimately coextensive with its responsible use. Importantly, it also as-
sumes we choose our actions and can be held accountable for them. As 
President Truman once observed, “[r]eal Americanism means also that 
liberty is not license. There is no freedom to injure others.”40 
 
 38. This is not to suggest that definition is not important. Definition is crucial. The misuse 
of the label “natural law,” including Justice Holmes’s misuse mentioned earlier, has almost cer-
tainly contributed to the current eclipse of its use in legal circles. 
 39. People often debate whether the Constitution was grounded in a “Judeo-Christian” 
morality, but while the morality of natural law is indeed reflected in Judeo-Christian teachings, 
it is much broader than Judaism and Christianity alone. Every major world religion, including 
not only Judaism and Christianity, but also Taoism, Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, 
Sikhism, and Jainism, teaches some paraphrase of what Christianity holds as the Golden Rule, 
that you should treat others as you would be treated, i.e. at least not harmed. See Karen Arm-
strong, The Great Transformation: The Beginning of our Religious Traditions 
(2006); C.S. Lewis, the Abolition of Man (HarperCollins ed. 2001) (1943). 
 40. Harry S. Truman, Address at the Dedication of the New Washington Headquarters 
of the American Legion (August 14, 1951), in 1951 Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry 
S. Truman 462 (1951), available at http://bit.ly/14qk9Dl. 
President Truman continued as follows: “The Constitution does not protect free speech 
to the extent of permitting conspiracies to overthrow the Government. Neither does the right of 
free speech authorize slander or character assassination. These limitations are essential to keep 
us working together in one great community.” Id. In another speech earlier in 1951, he elaborated 
on this concept. 
We talk a lot these days about freedom – freedom for the individual and freedom 
among nations. Freedom for the human soul is, indeed, the most important principle 
of our civilization. We must always remember, however, that the freedom we are talk-
ing about is freedom based upon moral principles. Without a firm moral foundation, 
freedom degenerates quickly into selfishness and license. Unless men exercise their 
freedom in a just and honest way, within moral restraints, a free society can degenerate 
into anarchy. Then there will be freedom only for the rapacious and those who are 
stronger and more unscrupulous than the rank and file of the people. 
If we neglect these truths, our whole society suffers. 
Harry S. Truman, Address at the Cornerstone Laying of the New York Avenue Presbyterian 
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On occasion, events transpire that bring us back to these natural 
law roots. In the Nüremberg war crimes trials following World War II, 
the prosecution turned to the concept of natural law to refute the de-
fendants’ arguments that they had merely followed the law of Hitler’s 
Germany when they committed the heinous crimes of which they were 
accused.41 The prosecution’s ultimately successful position was, in ef-
fect, that people simply know they should not treat other people in the 
manner the Nazis had treated the Jews and others, regardless of what 
the words of a nation’s positive law might require.42 Law can itself be-
come corrupt when it attempts to refute or contravene natural law. 
Natural law, as the Nüremburg war criminals learned, and as King 
George learned from the American colonists, will eventually trump 
contrary positive law. Natural law, with its fundamental premise that 
harming another is wrong unless warranted by extraordinary and ex-
ceptional circumstances, is a universal “higher law,” and when positive 
law fails to comport with its requirements this background moral law 
can be enforced separately. 
Making the same point in 1816, Thomas Jefferson wrote, “No man 
has a natural right to commit aggression on the equal rights of another: 
and this is all from which the laws ought to restrain him.”43 Setting 
aside discussion of what level of harm is sufficient to warrant criminal 
or other legal sanction and whatever else natural law may require in 
specific instances, natural law, as used herein, is a fundamental truth of 
human nature and a higher law than positive law, a higher moral law 
that calls upon all citizens to exercise their freedoms only in conjunc-
tion with a moral duty to refrain from actions that harm others. 
II. Discussion 
Given the above principle of natural law, two basic moral/legal 
questions arise that are answered in the framework of the Constitution 
itself, but which are often obscured by the background ideas being im-
plemented through modern judicial activism. 
 
Church (April 3, 1951), in Public Papers of the Presidents, supra, at 211. 
 41. See Michael R. Marrus, The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 1945–46: A Doc-
umentary History (1997); Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials 
(1993); Ann Tusa & John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial (2010). 
 42. See sources cited supra note 42. 
 43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to F.W. Gilmer (June 7, 1816), in Correspondence 
of Thomas Jefferson and Francis Walker Gilmer, 1814–1826, at 40 (Richard Beale Davis 
ed., Read Books 2007). 
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1. In light of natural law, what did the Founders consider the proper 
role of the government vis-à-vis the people? 
2. Within this government structure, what is the role of natural law 
in determining the freedoms of the people? 
A. The Role of Government Under Natural Law 
The Declaration’s reference to the “Laws of Nature and of Na-
ture’s God”44 envisions a government structure that is dependent on 
natural law for both its context and its content. First, natural law es-
tablishes that the government is an entity of limited authority and must 
therefore work within the context of the superior rights of its creators, 
the people. Government must “secure” or protect the people’s inalien-
able rights from the tendency of all government to overstep its bounds 
while not exceeding the restrictions imposed upon it within the natural 
law framework. In other words, it must guard the fundamental rights 
of its citizens without infringing on them. Yet, government is also ob-
ligated to help the people recognize their own responsibility under 
natural law to avoid harming one another. This duty requires the cre-
ation of legal content in the form of positive law rules and regulations. 
Accordingly, this content should be in the hands of those who must 
comply with it (or their elected representatives), and it should mini-
mize harm while allowing people to conduct their daily affairs with the 
greatest amount of freedom. This interplay between a people and their 
government, if both are responsive to the requirements of natural law, 
creates a potentially self-regulating system where governmental defer-
ence to inalienable rights combines with positive law’s enforcement of 
the private duty “not to harm” to secure an expanding atmosphere of 
peace and freedom. 
The seemingly innocuous phrase “among these are”45 indicates 
that the Declaration’s brief list of inalienable rights—“life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness”46—is not comprehensive of all rights con-
ferred by natural law. Indeed, the balance of the Declaration is prem-
ised on a fourth such right, “the Right of the People to alter or to abol-
ish”47 a government destructive of these fundamental rights and to 
 
 44. The Declaration of Independence, supra note 3, at para. 1. 
 45. Id. at para. 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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“institute new Government”48 that would respect the natural rights of 
the citizenry.49 After citing the repeated failures of the King to do so, 
the Declaration goes on to assert American sovereignty over its own 
territory, forming a new government consistent with the natural law 
King George had so egregiously and consistently violated.50 
Embodied in the Constitution is the Founders’ subsequent effort 
to frame a government that accomplished what natural law (and the 
Declaration) required. What must be born in mind here is that because 
the rights alluded to in the Declaration are granted by a higher law 
than that created by government, the government itself derives only 
indirectly from that higher source through a limited delegation of au-
thority from the true sovereigns, the people. Seen in this light, the “Bill 
of Rights,” comprising the first ten amendments to the Constitution,51 
should be perceived as a further enumeration and specification of the 
rights of the people vis-à-vis the subservient government they had cre-
ated and therefore as a list of limitations on the authority of govern-
ment (including the judiciary), not as a list of rights granted to the peo-
ple by the government in the tradition of King John and the Magna 
Carta.52 
Our government is one of limited powers, constitutionally shack-
led with numerous restrictions: limited terms of office, periodic elec-
tion, the veto power and its override, the balance in Congress between 
the Senate and House of Representatives, State involvement in amend-
ments to the Constitution, and the well-known system of checks and 
balances intended to keep a single branch of government from acquir-
ing too much authority or exceeding the authority delegated to it in 
the Constitution. The Constitution is devoid of any reference to au-
thority in the courts, for example, to create new law out of whole cloth, 
as in Roe or Lawrence, or to disregard and overrule the expressed will of 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. This right—also described as an affirmative duty in the Declaration—was not to be 
exercised for less than serious breaches and only after long and strenuous efforts to correct the 
government’s disregard of the peoples’ natural-law rights. Id. 
 50. Id. at para 6. 
 51. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments also fit easily into this category of mak-
ing express what was already implicit (i.e. bringing out more examples from the “among these 
are” doorway from natural law rights). 
 52. The notion of limited government has been well maintained by the Supreme Court in 
evaluating actions of the Legislative and Executive Branches; it is only in a lack of self-restraint 
on the part of the Judicial Branch (in “judicial activism”) that the Court sometimes appears to 
have lost track of the fact that the limited delegation of authority from the People also applies to 
the judiciary. 
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the people on moral questions, as in Romer and In re Marriage Cases, let 
alone to replace natural law as the moral/philosophical foundation of 
our legal system with a substitute of their own creation.53 Indeed, the 
Founders’ use of the word “unalienable” in the Declaration suggests 
the depth of their conviction on this point. 
B. The Hierarchy of “Rights” 
That the United States government was created under a limited 
delegation of authority from the people is further made clear by the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which reserve to the people and the 
States, respectively, all rights not delegated from the sovereign people 
(and States) to the federal government. Nonetheless, Congress and the 
States are free to legislate within a broad range of subject matter. 
Through legislation, the government can create another class of 
“rights.” A second class of rights beneath the inalienably granted or 
fundamental rights under natural law results from government enact-
ments and programs; they are rights that must be recognized by the 
government and by third parties, but which the government can 
choose to amend or repeal.54 A third class of rights that might be 
termed “conditional regulatory rights” or “privileges” is temporary 
and revocable by the government if the holder does not comply with 
the conditions for maintaining the right.55 A fourth class of rights may 
be perhaps best described as “tolerance-based” rights, “rights” which 
are permissible not because they are not harmful, but only because 
their harm is sufficiently attenuated that the legislature has decided not 
to criminalize them. These are actions which are undeniably harmful, 
but which the people’s representatives have decided to tolerate despite 
their reflection of an inherent disregard of personal responsibility to-
ward others.56 
It is critically important that we not blur the distinctions between 
fundamental rights granted by natural law and the various classes of 
 
 53. Indeed, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), with its presumption of 
authority in the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, might represent the first step away 
from the Founder’s intent, the first step away from the people as the ultimate sovereigns.  
 54. Examples include the rights of military veterans to enjoy certain benefits, the right to 
obtain a homestead patent upon qualification, or the right of qualified citizens to receive Medi-
caid. 
 55. Examples include the right to a driver’s license or a permit to graze livestock on state 
or federal lands. 
 56. Examples include the right to smoke in public or the right to drink alcohol, both of 
which are permitted but only within regulated limits. 
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legal rights established by those chosen to govern us. Our inalienable 
rights predate government and must be respected by its officials as they 
regulate and order public life. They restrict the reach and authority of 
government.57 The other classes of rights are the creations of our 
elected office holders and exist only subject to varying degrees of dis-
cretion in the government. Over the course of time, rights of this latter 
type can be amended, enlarged, redefined, or even revoked, as opposed 
to the “fundamental rights” based in natural law, which the govern-
ment cannot presume to alienate or alter, much less supplant in favor 
of, for example, a tolerance-based right. Such a supplanting would up-
end the Constitution entirely, denying its very foundation, source and 
grounding moral philosophy. 
Yet, it is a more rhetorical use of the word “rights” that we often 
hear in much of the ongoing public debate. What about “rights” that 
would seem more basic than permits or benefits, such as the right to 
health care or to a good education or, in the current context, to a right 
to public acknowledgment of a same-sex relationship by placing it on 
the same protected footing as traditional marriage? Do these types of 
alleged rights fit into the rights hierarchy described above, and if so, 
where? Proponents claim that same-sex marriage is a simple extension 
of fundamental constitutional rights. Is this true? A proper response to 
this question requires a closer examination of how the natural law on 
which the Declaration of Independence and Constitution were 
grounded affects not just governmental authority, but also individual 
freedom, and how, in the American system of government, natural law 
and positive law combine to determine and protect the freedoms of the 
people. 
C. Personal Freedom Under Natural Law 
As described above, the government is restricted by natural law and 
must perceive its limitations in deference to the superior fundamental 
rights of the people. In addition, the moral obligation under natural 
 
 57. In modern jurisprudence, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has 
developed hierarchical “substantive due process” analysis with increasing levels of scrutiny for 
various classes of private actions and the government’s ability to interfere with them. The lowest 
level of scrutiny is the “rational basis test” proceeding up to “heightened” or “strict scrutiny.” 
Heightened scrutiny is reserved for government regulation of a fundamental right, rational basis 
scrutiny for regulation of activities that do not rise to the level of fundamental rights. This paper 
proposes, as discussed hereafter, another and perhaps clearer and less inconsistent method of 
considering these issues, one that stems from the Declaration of Independence and is consistent 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s object of ensuring due process of law. 
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law not to cause harm also imposes duties on the citizens, duties which 
curtail the range of personal freedom of choice. These moral re-
strictions on one’s individual liberties are essential to the maximum 
overall freedom within society. Unless most people willingly surrender 
some freedom of choice in deference to their obligations to others, all 
people are likely, eventually, to experience increasing infringement on 
their rights, a loss of freedom by a beleaguered government attempting 
to enforce compliance with its positive law. 
While our freedoms are automatically limited by the fact that other 
people exist and share in the same rights we do, our freedoms are also 
enhanced by the presence of people with whom we enjoy our rights of 
peaceable assembly, free speech, and other activities related to our 
“pursuit of happiness.” In a nation established under natural law, many 
citizens live in a rich and wonderful web of relationships, interacting 
with one another according to various moral codes along a continuum 
from genuine concern for the welfare of other people to total self-ab-
sorption and the inclination to harm those who stand between them 
and fulfillment of short-term desires. Yet not all of these moral codes 
are equally effective in keeping peace and preserving freedom. 
If a person chooses to uphold a strict code of honesty, for example, 
his self-imposed restraint will engender trust and confidence from oth-
ers, enabling a quality of interaction with them that would not be pos-
sible if his prior actions had given rise to distrust, suspicion, or hostility. 
At a minimum, any person committed to the moral obligation not to 
harm others (required by natural law) will live up to basic responsibil-
ities and even display virtues such as patience, simple kindness or cour-
tesy, and compassion. She will more likely recognize that facts may not 
always support her preferences, and she will therefore often act con-
sistently with guidance from the truths of a situation regardless of the 
personal inconvenience, self-control, or additional work the attendant 
responsibilities require.  
In a seeming paradox, as people exercise a minimum of self-man-
agement, their scope of free activity tends to enlarge and become en-
hanced. The criminal and civil limitations imposed by law are all but 
irrelevant to these people since they have little or no desire to injure 
anyone and so do not need law to tell them what not to do. They honor 
their contractual commitments, respect the property and other rights 
of their fellow citizens, and are generally busy doing things with which 
the law is not concerned. By living willingly within the minimal moral 
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limits of the “no harm” standard, they have the freedom to be as mor-
ally “good” as they wish, by pursuing any number of morally acceptable 
opportunities within a wide range of preference. 
At the other end of the moral spectrum, however, the picture is 
quite different. A focus on self to the exclusion of others encourages 
individuals to take advantage of those around them for personal gain. 
Harm to others is of little or no concern, as long as “I get what I want.” 
Facts and even the meaning of words, like “tolerance,” are conven-
iently redefined, altered, or ignored to facilitate personal desires; and 
repeated patterns of dishonesty, fraud, and deceit confine one either to 
friends who can be trusted with secrets because they are complicit, or 
to superficial acquaintances from whom some aspects of one’s personal 
life must remain hidden. Appearances and façades must be cultivated 
and managed. At its extreme, this end of the spectrum exhibits such 
complete disregard for both truth and other people’s well-being that it 
often leads to the commission of crimes like theft, mayhem, arson, 
rape, child abuse, pedophilia, drug abuse, or even murder.58 
The paradox at this end of the moral spectrum is a reverse image 
of that described above. Here people tend to define “freedom” as li-
cense to “do whatever I want.” Yet by seeking licentious freedom to 
gratify one’s desires, the actual freedom experienced becomes progres-
sively more restricted. This selfish focus on desire gratification gener-
ally earns one distrust, wariness, dislike, and/or avoidance from others 
and perhaps with eventual financial and health problems related to ir-
responsibility and risky habits. If legal lines are crossed, worse possi-
bilities emerge, like fines, probation, city or county jail, state and fed-
eral penitentiaries, isolation in maximum security facilities, and even 
the death penalty. 
A free people installs a government under natural law specifically 
to inhibit, if not prohibit, this last form of “freedom.” Perhaps the ma-
jor role of our American government, certainly the end result of much 
of its positive law, concerns the creation of a line below which society 
will not permit an individual’s personal morality to fall without pun-
ishment—an articulation of the level of harm to others that the citizens 
in general will not accept. Otherwise, all may enjoy a wide range of 
 
 58. While many crimes involve at least some degree of mental illness, or at least distorted 
perception, all of them would seem to demonstrate a selfish desire for personal satisfaction at the 
cost of harm to another person, a violation of conscience and of a fundamental principle of natural 
law. 
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freedom, acting according to their interests and private views of mo-
rality by pursuing activities that remain above the line of legality es-
tablished in positive law. 
The mere establishment of such a line, however, cannot guarantee 
personal freedom. If the majority of citizens were to decide that good 
and evil equate to legal and illegal (i.e. if positive law were to become 
viewed as creating the moral standard), and were to pursue activities 
that barely skirt the legal limit, government would soon be over-
whelmed in its attempts to police those who breach the line. Enough 
people must live well above the legal standard of “no harm” to ensure 
that the government can instead focus primarily on problem cases. In 
the maintenance of freedom, it is critical that many citizens interpret 
their natural law duty at a higher level than simply the avoidance of 
harm, viewing it rather as a call to actively assist others. The importance 
of this role—usually fostered by churches and eleemosynary organiza-
tions that provide material assistance to those in need, religions that 
promote an other-centered lifestyle, and families that simply rear chil-
dren to work together, assume responsibility for one another and retain 
a conscious sense of duty not to harm others—cannot be overstated.59 
The more people who choose to live well above the “no harm” barrier 
of positive law, the more peaceful (and free) society will be.60 
The American Founders clearly recognized this relationship be-
tween freedom and morality under natural law.  James Madison: “To 
suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness 
without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.”61  John Adams: 
“Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It 
is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”62 Benjamin 
Franklin: “[O]nly a virtuous people are capable of freedom. As nations 
 
 59. Indeed, before the rise of the modern welfare state, family, nuclear and extended, pro-
vided much social welfare and church communities provided most of the balance. Meeting others’ 
needs was generally first assumed to be a family duty, a large part of what it meant to be family 
or kin, or to “belong” to a family. Caring for one’s kin in such ways, assuming this responsibility 
in life, was among the quintessential characteristics of family, nuclear and extended, and it still 
is—in strong families. 
 60. For a more detailed discussion of the role of familial or kin altruism in maintaining a 
peaceful and stable society, see A. Scott Loveless, The Macro Effects of Micro-Morality: Moral 
Law, Legal Law, and the “Rights-Based Approach” (July 17, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.law2.byu.edu/wfpc/About_the_WFPC/papers/MacroEffectsMicro.pdf. 
 61. 11 James Madison, The Papers of James Madison 158, 163 (Wm. T. Hutchinson 
et al. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1991) (1962) (Speech at the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788), 
available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s36 .html. 
 62. 9 C.F. Adams, The Works of John Adams 229 (Little, Brown & Co. 1854). 
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become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters.”63 
George Washington: “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to 
political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable sup-
ports. . . . It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary 
spring of popular government.64 
It is instructive that the only way our government can properly “al-
ienate” an individual citizen’s fundamental rights to property, liberty, 
or even life is when that citizen has failed to meet his or her duties 
toward other citizens by committing a tort, violating a contract duty, 
or committing a crime. The government cannot arbitrarily deprive a 
citizen of a fundamental right granted by natural law. However, when 
one citizen materially harms another, the government can then step in 
to abridge his or her individual right to property by imposing a fine, 
the personal right to liberty by requiring incarceration, and even the 
right to life itself in the most extreme cases. Because it is subservient 
to the people, the government must spell out and carefully follow spe-
cific requirements in order to deprive a person of such rights (proce-
dural due process), and tailor its restrictions according to the nature of 
the affected right and the degree of regulation (substantive due pro-
cess), but in doing so, it is in effect, enforcing a genuinely minimalist 
standard of the morality idealized by natural law. 
In sum, while the effect of natural law on a government is to limit 
the government’s authority to act against the people (due to their in-
alienable rights), it also has a vitally important and similarly “limiting” 
effect at the inter-personal level among the people. Within a natural 
law system, every citizen is morally bound by a minimal moral duty or 
responsibility not to harm others. As long as a majority of citizens re-
spect this moral limitation, the people remain in control of the breadth 
and depth of their own freedom. In Locke’s words: “Thus the Law of 
Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as oth-
ers.”65 
 
 63. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Messrs, the Abbes Chalut and Arnaud (Apr. 17, 
1787), in The Works of Benjamin Franklin 297 (Jared Sparks ed., 1840). 
 64. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), in Addresses and Messages 
of the Presidents of the United States from Washington to Harrison,  56, 62 (1841). 
 65. Locke, supra note 22, at 30–32. 
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D. Determining Fundamental Rights 
The clamor for “my rights” among various groups of Americans 
has become almost deafening. People speak of “the right to education” 
or “the right to health care” or “the right to food and shelter” as if our 
government is withholding ready-made services that could be imme-
diately dispensed to anyone who wants or needs them and is violating 
the citizens’ inalienable rights by doing so. As mentioned earlier, some 
people do have the “right” to avail themselves of established govern-
ment programs, including social entitlements to education and health 
care intended to lift the burdens of those in poverty. However, a gov-
ernment benefit, whether broadly granted or narrowly defined, is only 
a government-created right for which one must qualify and which 
might at some time be altered or repealed. If “we the people” have a 
fundamental right to good health, the government does not have a duty 
to provide us with that good health, but only to protect our right to 
pursue it. The government must not take away our opportunities to 
seek it or to provide it to one another. 
The ability to behave in ways that might appall the neighbors or 
one’s grandparents is another “right” much in demand: “I have the 
right to do that. It’s not illegal!” In fact, all actions not specifically pro-
hibited by law are, according to the natural law model, allowed in a free 
society. These behavior-related rights usually involve addictive habits 
that are undeniably harmful, but to a lesser or debatable degree—per-
haps primarily harmful to the individual participating in it. Such be-
havior is often regulated, but is not prohibited except in extreme cases 
where concern for the public welfare is justified, e.g. individuals over a 
certain age can choose to drink beer or hard liquor, but cannot operate 
a motor vehicle after consuming a designated amount. Within legal 
limitations, citizens have the “right” to drink, smoke, gamble, use foul 
language, insult other people, dress in a peculiar manner, and engage 
in numerous other activities that might be frowned upon by others. 
This is the fourth class of rights alluded to earlier, “tolerance-based” 
rights. 
Inevitably, over time, the precise placement of the legal limits 
drawn on such behaviors (always in response to the implicit question: 
“How much harm or risk of harm are we willing to tolerate?”) is re-
peatedly debated. This freedom of the people to revisit an issue or to 
maintain a somewhat flexible line, one that fluctuates as better infor-
mation is gathered, is an important feature of government based in 
natural law. For example, recent restrictions on smoking in airplanes 
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or public buildings demonstrate that some harmful behaviors can be 
regulated after long periods of general acceptance, once the serious 
nature of the harm is recognized and understood. Regulation in such 
cases does not violate fundamental rights, even though it restricts a 
former “freedom.” Nor does decriminalizing a behavior suddenly ele-
vate its status to a constitutionally protected inalienable right, or even 
to constitutional protection at the lower level of the rational basis test. 
A range of activities involving some level of risk to others are only tol-
erated, not protected under the Constitution, and this is the range 
where the legislatures, not the judicial branch, perform their function 
in deciding what will be tolerated and what will not. 
It is essential that “the people” are able to distinguish among “tol-
erance rights,” government-granted rights, and the fundamental, inal-
ienable rights under natural law that must be respected and protected 
by those who govern, for if some form of tolerance-based right be-
comes elevated to the level of, or even supersedes, a fundamental right, 
our system of law becomes fundamentally altered and endangered, our 
Constitution (and the Declaration) mere puffs of smoke. Such “rights” 
can only be implemented and enforced by positive law overriding nat-
ural law, and when positive law transcends or supplants the natural 
moral law, we revert to being subject to the will of a modern King 
George or Hitler; we lose the true “fundamental rights” the Founders 
secured for us and to which government itself is subject. 
One useful guideline is to consider that fundamental rights are not 
those claimed by one citizen against another (we call such personal vi-
olations “crimes” or “torts,” not “violations of human rights”). Funda-
mental rights are universal, shared by all people, and only in certain 
limited instances may a governing body violate them, or place one such 
right in priority over another. While a comprehensive list of specific 
inalienable rights endowed by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s 
God”66 might vary from citizen to citizen, the idea behind such rights 
arises from instincts we share as human beings that certain freedoms 
should exist among all peoples in all times, whether in highly complex 
societies or in simple family groups. 
Indeed, a definitive litmus test for a fundamental right under nat-
ural law would be to imagine a society where everyone employed that 
right fully.67 If every member of our American society were to freely 
 
 66. The Declaration of Independence, supra note 3, at para. 1. 
 67. Some argue that homosexuality ought to be recognized as a “fundamental human 
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and responsibly practice their freedom of religion, freedom of the 
press, or freedom of speech, for example, society could thrive without 
harm to anyone.68 Even the moral limitations on our freedoms im-
posed by natural law exhibit this characteristic. If everyone were to ac-
cept and practice duty and responsibility toward others as a limit on 
the gratification of personal desires and preferences, roads would be 
safer, business both more efficient and profitable, divorce virtually 
nonexistent, and more children would be raised in a loving and secure 
environment. Moreover, trust in others could be safely assumed, taxes 
greatly reduced, and government minimized, among other social ben-
efits. 
The effective functioning of American democracy and freedom it-
self depends on these distinctions between classes of rights and, above 
all, on their moral (no harm) use. A jurist in the United Kingdom, Sir 
John Laws, recently observed: “A society whose values are defined by 
reference to individual rights is by that very fact already impoverished. 
Its culture says nothing about individual duty—nothing about virtue . 
. . Accordingly rights must be put in their proper place.”69 
For rights to be kept “in their proper place,” they must never sup-
plant or override the moral duties that balance them. Thomas Jeffer-
son, in his second inaugural address, asserted: “We are firmly con-
vinced, and we act on that conviction, that with nations, as with 
individuals, our interests soundly calculated, will ever be found insep-
arable from our moral duties . . . .”70 Sir Laws continues in this vein, 
noting that a generation that knows Hitler or Stalin only as historical 
figures “may not see rights as an antidote against tyranny but rather as 
a legitimate means of promoting their own interests above the interests 
 
right,” that is, a right acknowledged in the soft law and positive law treaties, agreements, regula-
tions, and practices that combine to form international law. If this right were exercised universally 
and exclusively, human society would come to an end within a single generation. Construing the 
right more broadly—for example, as a fundamental “right to have sex with any willing partner” 
so as to apply equally to heterosexuals—would also undermine and ultimately destroy the im-
portant role of monogamous marriage and family in the perpetuation of human life and training 
in moral education, also resulting in the eventual demise of civilized society. 
 68. Obviously, freedom of religion cannot be construed consistently with natural law as a 
means or justification to harm others or commit acts of terrorism in the name of one’s faith. This 
demonstrates once more how natural law places moral restrictions on the people as well as on the 
government. 
 69. John Laws, Beyond Rights, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 265, 268–69 (2003). 
 70. Thomas Jefferson, Writings 518 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
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of others.”71 His implication is that rights thus misconstrued can facil-
itate tyranny rather than defend against it. In his words, “Unless per-
sonal moral values are seen as duty not rights, the subservience of the 
State to the people will at length become corrupted.”72 
E. Judicial Activism and the Rejection of Natural Law 
The minimum level of morality required by natural law, that peo-
ple should not harm others, was largely accepted in the United States, 
even assumed, until an alternative approach to morality began to gain 
political traction in the mid-20th century.  Known today through con-
cepts such as “political correctness,” “moral relativism,” “religious hu-
manism,” and other catch phrases, including the “rights-based ap-
proach to human rights law,”73 it appears, at first blush, to be a simple 
extension of the duty-based morality of natural law because it calls on 
people to champion the “human rights” of certain minorities perceived 
to be so underprivileged, neglected, and downtrodden that they cannot 
speak for themselves. On closer examination, however, it becomes clear 
that this philosophy rejects the principles, and even the very concept, 
of natural law. Beginning with the assumption that one moral system 
is neither better nor more natural than another, its proponents argue 
that every aspect of human life is “socially constructed,” the product of 
immersion in the norms of a given culture. One lifestyle choice is thus 
presumed as valid and valuable as any other, negating the need to re-
strict private behavior. 
On the political plane, however, this alternative moral assumption 
has the effect of shifting the “no harm” requirement of natural law 
from a duty to restrict one’s own behavior toward others to a demand 
that others accept any and all personal behavior “from me.”  This sub-
tle but critical sea change shifts society away from the self-regulation 
of natural law toward a system that requires a large amount of govern-
ment intervention and enforcement. The government must compel 
compliance with norms it establishes, since no guiding principle, no 
“social conscience” apart from government, exists as an internal guide 
 
 71. Laws, supra note 69, at 266. 
 72. Id. at 278. 
 73. For a more detailed discussion of the rights-based approach, see A. Scott Loveless, 
Children on the Front Lines of an Ideological War: The Differing Values of Differing Values, 22 St. 
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 371 (2003). 
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for the citizens. Without a “north star” moral standard outside of gov-
ernment to measure against, this system relies on positive law alone to 
establish a universal code of conduct. The result is greater, uninhibited 
freedom of behavior for some at the expense, primarily, of freedom of 
belief and greater safety for others. Even “fundamental rights” become 
creations of governmental debate and action, often based on whatever 
issues are in fashion at the time. Since all rights are legislated, they are 
also subject to revision, with the result that no rights are truly inalien-
able. 
Another feature of this alternative morality is that its advocates 
seek to protect not just categories of people who share distinctions over 
which they have no control, but also behaviors, such as the use of cer-
tain illegal drugs or pornography, over which they can exert control. It 
is axiomatic in a natural law-based legal system that the law restricts 
only problematic behaviors, not privately held beliefs, but this alterna-
tive morality tends to create protected classes of behavior that are only 
“tolerated” under natural law due to their potentially harmful charac-
ter. Its advocates often downplay or disregard the harmful effects of 
those choices at the societal level, exacerbating tension with such ques-
tions as, “Do we overlook the harm if the action is between consenting 
adults?” Arguments originating from this perspective have spawned 
concepts like “victimless crime” and “right of privacy” and have altered 
common, trusted words by giving them new meanings. “Tolerance,” 
for example, comes to mean the acceptance of all lifestyles as equal in 
value, and one can demand this version of tolerance without extending 
it to others who see unique value in, say, the principles of natural law. 
It is worth observing that in those cases where modern judicial ac-
tivism in the United States is most apparent, such as in Roth v. United 
States,74 Roe and its progeny, Lawrence, Romer, Goodridge, and In re Mar-
riage Cases, the courts have consistently moved in one direction only: 
away from the citizen’s moral duty requirements under natural law, 
which requires a degree of self-control, and toward this alternate ver-
sion of morality that perceives some areas of license as a protected 
moral good.75 As a result, we now have a novel and virtually unchecked 
 
 74. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (holding that obscene material is protected 
under the constitutional protection of freedom of speech, and therefore beyond the states’ au-
thority to regulate except in extreme cases). Later cases further restricted the states’ ability to 
regulate, much less define, obscenity. This was a usurpation of states’ rights by the federal gov-
ernment, arguably in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 
 75. A common argument is that there is no significant harm in such actions. The high and 
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“right of privacy,” invented in Griswold v. Connecticut (in the name of 
protecting the sanctity and importance of marriage), a seemingly in-
nocuous right later expanded in Roe v. Wade and its successors to deny 
completely the right to life of the unborn in favor of the right of a 
woman to control her own body, regardless of the views of state legis-
latures comprised of representatives elected by the people. The pe-
numbral right of privacy now casts its own shadow not only over mar-
riage, but over the Constitution itself and our sacred inalienable rights. 
In Lawrence, the Court further expanded the privacy right to in-
clude how and with whom one might choose to have sex, in favor of a 
morally preferred sexual license, without regard for the weight of prec-
edent such as Bowers v. Hardwick,76 and again without regard for the 
expressed law created by a state legislature of publicly elected officials. 
In doing so the Court may not have adequately considered the harmful 
social consequences and possible valid reasons for which the Texas 
Legislature, like many others, may have enacted its prohibition and 
satisfied the rational basis test in doing so. In Romer, the Supreme 
Court struck down a state constitutional amendment that simply af-
firmed that homosexuality would not be considered a separate “pro-
tected class” under the state constitution (but not denying homosexu-
als the same rights all other citizens held).77 More recently, in Goodridge 
and In re Marriage Cases, activist state supreme courts have relied on 
this same “right of privacy,” along with a new view of “human dignity,” 
to elevate homosexual relationships to a position of equal value to so-
ciety as reproductive man-woman unions.78 The effect of this “equal-
ity” is a leveling one—by raising the status of homosexual pairings it 
actually devalues as “special” the role and unique and vital social con-
tributions of heterosexual marriage.79 Children, America’s future, are 
 
rising rates of crime and violence (even among the youth and in schools), child and spouse abuse, 
the general coarsening of society, the AIDS pandemic and sexually transmitted diseases, drug and 
alcohol abuse and addiction, as well as the recently much publicized ethical breaches in business 
and lending practices, indicate that such is not the case. 
 76. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003) (holding that state legislatures have the right to legislate against homosexual acts). 
 77. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 620 (1996). 
 78. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 446 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 748 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 79. This competing morality also underlies no-fault divorce, which virtually swept the 
country in the 1970s and 1980s, replacing the formerly acknowledged duties of husband and wife 
to each other—even when those duties run counter to revised personal desires, often licentious 
in character. 
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left out of the equation or at least pushed into the background as ex-
traneous, in favor of the immediate “rights” of selfish adults unbridled 
by considerations of effects on others. 
In these critical cases involving moral issues, the respective courts 
have also elevated themselves to a position of unusual authority, deny-
ing the place of the legislative branch, much less the formerly sover-
eign people and states, to speak to such questions. Contrast these in-
stances of judicial activism with the recent language of the New York 
Supreme Court when confronting a similar issue: “It is not for us to 
say whether same-sex marriage is right or wrong. We have presented 
some (though not all) of the arguments against same-sex marriage be-
cause our duty to defer to the Legislature requires us to do so.” 80 
By imposing court-determined value judgments in the place of nat-
ural law (and in place of the legislature), certain judges have reinter-
preted the Constitution as rejecting the very natural law-based rights 
it was intended to preserve and which these judges were sworn to pro-
tect. Both actions appear profoundly unconstitutional81 and call into 
question the ability of the courts to police themselves as strictly as do 
the other branches of government. The unique guiding principles the 
Founders described as “unalienable,” are rapidly being alienated by 
courts that replace the Founders’ intent with alternative, and ulti-
mately dangerous views. 
F. Marriage As Seen Under Natural Law 
Aside from its involvement with the legal issues surrounding abor-
tion, pornography as artistic expression,82 cohabitation, the “separa-
tion of church and state,” and divorce and family law questions, this 
alternative view of morality also drives the current efforts to redefine 
marriage, using positive law in an attempt to reform an institution that 
precedes positive law and is truly a function of natural law. It urges a 
view of marriage based solely in personal fulfillment and selfish self-
interest. Traditional marriage is not just about sex, or even about sex 
and affection. While it does encompass feelings of friendship, romance, 
 
 80. Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 366 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 81. It might also be suggested that the best argument for allowing displays of the Ten 
Commandments in courthouses and in public facilities is not that they promote a particular reli-
gion or a belief in God, but that they emphasize the relation of our law to the moral principles of 
natural law, which are reflected in the Ten Commandments. 
 82. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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and mutual self-fulfillment, marriage is first and foremost about ac-
cepting the obligation and responsibility to create, raise, and provide 
for a family. Marriage is generative, not derivative or dependent; it 
channels sexual expression into a path that naturally produces children, 
a new generation of human beings, and it demands that the marriage 
partners take responsibility for those children—responsibility for nur-
turing, educating, providing moral instruction, and in general prepar-
ing them for the future—and for the financial obligations inherent in 
doing so. Marriage is about creating a family, and family is all about 
responsibility for each other. It is about making a public commitment 
to remain together even through the disappointments, hardships, and 
inevitable changes encountered by every couple, in order to assume the 
responsibility of preparing a rising generation for their own turn with 
the torch of freedom, for their own responsible adulthood and citizen-
ship. Of all the issues involving the moral debates of the modern “cul-
ture wars,” transforming marriage into a simple creation for adult pref-
erence and pleasure represents perhaps the single greatest blow to the 
natural law foundations of our Constitution. 
John Adams wrote, “The foundations of national morality must be 
laid in private families. In vain are schools, academies, and universities, 
instituted, if loose principles and licentious habits are impressed upon 
children in their earliest years.”83 The family in which a marriage be-
tween a man and a woman produces, nurtures, and teaches children is, 
in the final analysis, the core feature that natural law is intended to 
protect because it is the surest training ground for developing the 
“moral sense” that shapes responsible, caring citizens and helps them 
avoid the inclination to do harm. By building this moral center, families 
help preserve maximum freedom in society by preserving natural law 
morality among the people. The government cannot serve this func-
tion, and by attempting it, would only undermine families in the role 
only they can genuinely fulfill. 
Locke asserted that “the fundamental Law of Nature being the preser-
vation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against 
 
 83. John Adams, Diary, in III The Works of John Adams 94, 171 (1854). Adams’s 
comment in the full quote might also give us pause to consider the rising proportions of American 
children being raised in a fragmented family or otherwise by a single parent. The proportion of 
children born to an unmarried mother has risen from below ten to almost forty percent (39.7% 
in 2007) in the last forty years, and much higher in some subpopulations. Stephanie J. Ventura, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Changing Patterns of Nonmarital Childbear-
ing in the United States 2 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ data/databriefs/db18.pdf. 
  
BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
392 
it.”84 Traditional marriage meets the key requirements both Locke and 
Adams identify; it “preserv[es] Mankind” by allowing for its regenera-
tion and, when conducted properly, it provides children with real-life 
experience in the moral principles on which our American freedoms 
depend. Traditional heterosexual marriage and its natural perpetuation 
of human life, its commitment to the preparation of the rising genera-
tion, and its internal consistency with the right/duty tie of natural law 
to positive law cannot be duplicated by a homosexual pairing. 
Undoubtedly numerous gay and lesbian couples truly care about 
each other and enjoy their sexual relationship, share financial and other 
obligations, and contribute to the community and each other’s’ ex-
tended families. But they will never share the wonderment of looking 
into the face of an infant, a miracle that they together have created, nor 
will they feel the intensity and weight of that joint responsibility 
stretching into the future. It is biologically impossible. 
Until Lawrence, homosexual behavior was considered sufficiently 
harmful to justify State regulation or prohibition.85 Some of the harms 
of homosexuality are well-known, such as its role as a primary vector 
in the spread of HIV/AIDS and other public and private health risks.86 
Other significant costs and risks are less publicized.87 While the ho-
 
 84. Locke, supra note 22, at 36–38. 
 85. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court did not conclude that homosexual activity was a fun-
damental right, only that Texas had not satisfied the lower rational-basis test to prohibit it. Given 
the established risks to personal and public health and well-being, among others, one might won-
der how strenuously Texas argued its case. See generally What’s the Harm?: Does Legalizing 
Same-Sex Marriage Really Harm Individuals, Families or Society? (Lynn D. Wardle ed., 
2008); A. Dean Byrd & Shirley E. Cox, Strict Scrutiny of Prospective Adoptive Parents: What Chil-
dren Really Need, in The Family in the New Millennium: World Voices Supporting the 
“Natural” Clan (A. Scott Loveless & Thomas B. Holman eds., 2007). In any event, behavior 
receiving constitutional protection only at the level of surviving the rational-basis test does not 
rise to the level of a fundamental right under natural law. With better evidence of harm and, 
therefore, a legitimate state interest, appropriate regulation might still be instituted. 
 86. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior 
and Their Relevance for Family Law Policies, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 997 (2007). 
 87. Despite the volume, frequency and intensity of the rhetoric on this topic, it is not a 
scientifically established fact that homosexuality is a genetically determined trait. Dr. Francis S. 
Collins, head of the Human Genome Project at the National Institute of Health, after reviewing 
the literature on homosexuality and genetics, concluded, “There is an inescapable component of 
heritability to many human behavioral traits,” including homosexuality, but that “for virtually 
none of them is heredity ever close to predictive.” Francis S. Collins, The Language of God 
226 (Free Press 2006). Hair, eye, and skin color are genetically determined. There is no way 
around them. The statistical genetic component for homosexuality (from .20 down to .11, de-
pending on the statistical model employed) is more akin to that for depression, or to an increased 
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mosexual community undoubtedly desires to be recognized as “nor-
mal,” and to have their style of sexual behavior freed of its historical 
stigma, the rush to judgment and the sudden impetus to give it equal 
footing with traditional marriage is premature. In contrast with heter-
osexual marriage, and whatever its ultimate harm to public well-being 
may or may not be, homosexual activity does not directly benefit soci-
ety. It only satisfies the desires of the individuals involved, in the pat-
tern of tolerance-based rights. The attitude with which it is trumpeted 
as a “right” and the tone and strength of the campaign to normalize 
this behavior have seen few equals, even in recent history. They have 
the feel of precisely the type of “self-interested promotion” Sir Laws 
warns against—the use of “rights” as a means to self-interested ends 
rather than serving the larger interest of society.88 
It is possible that many Americans would not wish to outlaw the 
cohabitation of a genuinely devoted homosexual couple, regardless of 
any discomfort with same-sex behavior. However, when condoning it 
includes redefining traditional marriage as no more beneficial to soci-
ety than homosexual coupling, when homosexual practices are pre-
sented as an acceptable option in the schools, even introducing young 
schoolchildren for the first time to the concept of this practice (which, 
post-Goodridge, is now happening in Massachusetts and elsewhere), it 
becomes a matter of deeper concern. When it also means redefining 
marriage and thereby implicitly denying or brushing aside the social 
benefits of traditional marriage and the consequent importance of its 
normative function in society, the sense of alarm becomes urgent. 
In the long run, however, the greatest adverse effect of this shift 
may be its overall erosive influence on the self-regulating aspects of 
natural law to a peaceful, free society—the logical result of changing 
the definition of marriage to include homosexual couples. The recent 
leap from prohibition (even if largely unenforced) to constitutional 
 
susceptibility to an addiction to alcohol or tobacco after exposure. It indicates a predisposition at 
most, not a biological given, and it does not foreclose the human capacity to choose one’s behav-
ior. A predisposition would never be expressed without environmental exposure. Nat’l Assoc. 
for Research & Therapy of Homosexuality, http://www.narth.com. For the sake of argu-
ment, it may be possible that some people professing homosexual orientation were born with a 
genetic predisposition, as opposed to a genetic determination, in that regard. However, it has not 
been demonstrated, given the powerful, pleasurable stimulus of the sexual experience and the 
known problems of addiction to sex among some heterosexuals, that early, pubescent (or later 
repeated) exposure to homosexual acts and Pavlovian association and habituation are not at least 
equally explanatory. 
 88. Laws, supra note 69. 
  
BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
394 
protection demonstrates the significance of shifting the moral founda-
tion of a legal system from one philosophical base to another, in this 
case from natural law to an alternative morality emphasizing freedom 
alone, freedom unhinged from responsibility to others, freedom that is 
often hostile to the self-restraint that natural law requires. Rights so 
perceived, destabilize rather than protect, and ultimately jeopardize 
our freedoms in this democratic republic. 
III. Conclusion 
The framers of the Constitution were guided by the moral and 
philosophical principles of the Declaration of Independence, the con-
cept of natural law being chief among them. Many modern social issues 
turn on moral issues, but our courts often seem adrift on the moral 
questions, lacking a North Star, influenced by whatever social fad is 
currently in vogue or has captured the attention of the media. Reliable 
guidance is available, however, by simply turning back to the original 
source document that started it all, the Declaration of Independence.  
Although one might address any of several current issues in the 
light of natural law, this article has focused on whether same-sex mar-
riage comports with the Constitution. With regard to marriage and the 
Constitution, the first question to consider is whether marriage is 
merely a creation of government and therefore subject to government 
modification, or whether it is an “inalienable” feature of natural law 
that the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were in-
tended to protect. Stated differently, is marriage simply the right to 
public acknowledgment and acceptance of a frequently ephemeral am-
orous relationship? Or is it the fresh spring for long-term generation 
and regeneration of society, placing sexual union into a restricted con-
text of fidelity, commitment, and long-term acceptance of responsibil-
ity that both benefits children and society? Is marriage not itself a pri-
mary feature of natural law, which should therefore remain outside the 
scope of government interference, let alone redefinition? 
The second and companion question is whether the judicial activ-
ism that has decreed constitutional protection for same-sex “marriage” 
is a judicial violation of substantive due process and the constitutional 
separation of powers, a government in the style of King George, with 
judges rather than a king, a model rejected more than 200 years ago. 
Looking through the lens of natural law, we might well conclude that 
if the people of a given state decide that they can “tolerate” same-sex 
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relationships and the associated public health risks and costs to the tax-
payer, to the extent they are willing to afford it some form of legal 
recognition, their elected representatives can enact legislation to make 
suitable provision for the experiment. But it should not be done so as 
to equate such relationships with traditional marriage, and it should 
not be accomplished through a judicial fiat of extra-constitutional 
“rights.” It would necessarily remain no more than a government-cre-
ated and “tolerance-based” right, susceptible to amendment or repeal 
if the harm is greater than anticipated, as was done when states began 
to legislate against smoking in public as a public health risk. A created 
government cannot invent a new fundamental right that contradicts 
the higher natural law under which the government itself was created. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the right to marry a member of 
the opposite sex must be seen as a fundamental right, an “inalienable” 
feature lying at the heart of natural law. Its covenantal heritage pre-
dates all government and its male/female nature brings to the world 
the children to whom natural law subsequently grants their precious 
and “unalienable” rights. If marriage becomes no more than a label of 
social approbation for any amorous or close relationship, we will truly 
have lost the major safe harbor of responsibility-based, natural law mo-
rality—the “foundation of the fabric” once described by George Wash-
ington for which he and the other Founders placed their best efforts 
and risked their lives.89 
Almost two centuries after the founding, in his 1961 inaugural ad-
dress, President John F. Kennedy proclaimed that these principles were 
still alive. 
[T]he same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are 
still at issue around the globe—the belief that the rights of man come 
not from the generosity of the state, but from the hand of God. 
We . . . [are] unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those 
human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and 
to which we are committed today at home and around the world.90 
 
 89. The extended quotation from George Washington reads as follows: 
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and mo-
rality are indispensable supports. . . . It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a 
necessary spring of popular government. . . . Who that is a sincere friend to it can look 
with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?  
George Washington, Farewell Address, supra note 64, at 62. 
 90. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in Inaugural Addresses of the 
Presidents of the United States 305, 306 (1989). 
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In the question of recognizing same-sex relationships, we are once 
again being asked to choose between two mutually exclusive moral sys-
tems on which to base the law: the natural law providing the core prin-
ciples of the Declaration of Independence and the United States Con-
stitution or an alternative morality based in moral relativism that 
allows people to, through law, turn their personal preferences into 
“rights” regardless of the social consequences—a “morality” that 
would facilitate the “undoing of those human rights to which this Na-
tion has always been committed . . . .”91 In 1776, the Founders chose 
natural law and made enormous sacrifices to afford us our responsible 
freedoms. Our country has benefitted immensely from their choice 
and sacrifices. Our future optimal course may be uncertain, but we 
should first be aware of the full implications, rather than allow our-
selves to be force-fed by judicial decree or dissembling social advo-
cates. We must not confuse or conflate our fundamental rights and re-
sponsibilities under natural law with lesser, government-created rights, 
much less with tolerance-based “rights” which might as easily be reg-
ulated as a public nuisance like smoking or drunk driving. Doing so 
stands the Constitution on its head. The vitality of our form of gov-
ernment and the Constitution itself are ultimately at stake, lying on the 
block alongside marriage. In Lincoln’s immortal words, the question is 
whether a “government of the people, by the people, for the people, 
shall not perish from the earth” without the moral constraints of nat-
ural law, its lifeblood.92 
 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Lincoln, supra note 10. 
